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ABSTRACT 
In this article, it is suggested that the new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) redistributes rents from the superstars back to the 
median voters. In particular, it is suggested that portions of the new agreement, such as 
salary caps, are designed to improve the rather skewed distribution of salaries in the 
NBA. Evidence from a Lorenz curve analysis of the first 2 years under the new contract 
suggests that all players with salaries below the median wage gain from the new agreement, 
and those with salaries closest to the median wage gain the most. The analysis suggests 
that skewed salary distributions may lead to CBAs that redistribute the rents from the 
rich (superstars) to the poor (median voters). 
  
Over the years, the primary goal of the unions representing professional athletes 
in baseball, football, hockey, and basketball has been the negotiation of free agency 
for the players. Under the old reserve system that prevailed in all sports, players’ 
services were the sole properties of the clubs that first contracted them, typically 
following some sort of draft procedure. Under the reserve system, players were 
unable to increase their bargaining power during salary negotiations by threatening 
to play elsewhere. Rottenberg (1956) was the first to point out the monopsonistic 
exploitation inherent in this industry structure. Scully (1969) provided empirical 
estimates of the extent of the level of exploitation by Major League Baseball 
(MLB). 
 
The Major League Baseball Players Association won free agency for its members 
as a result of a 1976 arbitration hearing. The National Basketball Players Asso- 
ciation (NBPA) won free agency as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the 
Oscar Robertson case.1 Ultimately, the dissolution of the reserve system and the 
introduction of competitive bidding for free agents led to large salary increases for 
some players as well as freedom of choice in location. Free agency is now also 
available for professional football and hockey players. 
 
The repeal of the perpetual reserve rule has allowed sports unions to increase the 
shares of team revenues accruing to the players. Likewise, resistance to hard salary 
caps and negotiations over the percentages of revenues allocated to salaries represent 
sports unions’ efforts to expropriate larger shares of owners’ monopoly profits 
for their members. In this respect, sports unions perform much the same function as 
the traditional monopoly face of unions as identified by Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) in their influential book, What Do Unions Do? In their book, however, Freeman 
and Medoff suggested that there are two faces of unions: the monopoly face 
and the collective voice face. They suggested that a union is not only a monopoly 
seller of labor but also a political force for its members. The collective voice model 
suggests that through collective bargaining, unions maximize the well-being of 
median workers. This model suggests less wage dispersion within union establishments, 
work rules that benefit more senior workers, and more clearly defined grievance 
and arbitration procedures. 
 
In sports unions, the collective voice face seems to have been mostly dormant. 
Only two articles have addressed aspects of the median voter model in professional 
sports: Bishop, Finch, and Formby (1990), and White (1986). White (1986) suggested 
that the traditional median voter model explains aspects of the 1982 free 
agency agreement in the National Football League (NFL). Bishop et al. (1990) also 
analyzed the NFL agreement and suggested that a risk-averse median voter model 
explains the agreement better. In the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
unions have typically resisted negotiating many measures dealing with the internal 
distribution of salaries. The main exception to this statement is the establishment of 
a minimum salary. Another exception of more recent origin is the establishment of a 
scale for rookie salaries based on the player’s place in the draft (Staudohar, 1996, 
pp. 106-126). 
 
The new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that emerged from the contentious 
negotiations between the NBPA and the NBA owners may prove to represent a 
turning point in sports unions’ goals and a blueprint for upcoming negotiations in 
other sports. The hard caps placed on superstar salaries in the new NBA agreement 
combined with other aspects of the CBA appear to represent a shift by the union 
toward greater concern for the internal distribution of salaries. This development 
suggests that the implications of the median voter model have manifested themselves 
in a sports union much as they have been applied in traditional unions for 
decades. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Until the 1998-1999 season, the NBA had never canceled a game due to a labor 
dispute. The relationship between the NBPA and the owners seemed to be working 
well. In the 1983 CBA between the NBA owners and the NBPA, a salary cap was 
added to help restrain the upward spiral of player salaries. The quid pro quo to the 
players for their acceptance of the cap was a guaranteed percentage share of gross 
revenues from basketball-related income (BRI) (Staudohar, 1996, pp. 118-119). 
Gramlich (1994) called the salary cap system employed by the NBA an example of 
“communitarian capitalism.” He proposed that the presence of a strong commissioner 
and a commitment by management and labor towork together to promote the 
common good of the sport had pulled the NBA out of a financial quagmire and 
made it a success. He contrasted this scenario with the picture of “individualistic 
capitalism” employed by MLB, in which the union and owners were unable to 
agree on a salary cap. The basic structure of the NBA compromise settlement lasted 
through two more collective bargaining negotiations for new agreements in 1988 
and 1995, despite antitrust court cases, threats to decertify the union, and threats of 
a lockout. The rising popularity of the NBA created a surge in revenues from television 
broadcasts and attendance. Average player salaries soared along with NBA 
revenues. What happened to ruin the NBA’s streak of no work stoppages? 
 
The lockout in the NBA at the start of the 1998-1999 season implies that the form 
of capitalism used in the NBA was not as communitarian as suggested by Gramlich 
(1994). Like their counterparts in professional baseball, football, and hockey, NBA 
owners have not been able to curtail spending on free agent players. The salary cap 
that was started in 1983 was not a hard cap; several exceptions existed. The most 
egregious exception to the soft salary cap was called the Bird Exception, named 
after Larry Bird, of the Boston Celtics. The Bird Exception allowed a team to pay 
any amount of money to keep one of its own players who had become a free agent, 
without regard to the cap (National Basketball Association, 1995, p. 76). This 
exception was designed to allow teams to reward their superstar players so as to not 
lose them to another team in a bidding war. Instead, owners often overbid on other 
free agents to lure them away from their current teams, staying just under the cap, 
before negotiating with their own superstars. Of course, such teams’ salary levels 
greatly exceeded the cap after their own superstars were signed to contracts, but this 
did not violate the agreement because of the Bird Exception. In most seasons, a 
majority of teams exceeded the cap.2 
 
Under the terms of the 1995 CBA between the NBA and the NBPA, the owners 
could terminate the agreement after the 1997-1998 season or any season thereafter 
if the percentage of BRI devoted to player salaries exceeded 51.8% (National Basketball 
Association, 1995, p. 185). This threshold was exceeded in the 1997-1998 
season; it is estimated that salaries and benefits were about 57.2% of BRI. Facing 
the likely retirement of Michael Jordan and a possible decline in NBA popularity 
and revenue, on March 23, 1998, the owners voted to exercise this option in the 
agreement and renegotiate for new terms. Following a few fruitless discussions in 
which the union adamantly opposed any attempt to replace the soft salary cap with a 
hard cap, the owners imposed a lockout. 
 
Negotiations for the union were led by G.William Hunter, executive director of 
The NBPA, and the union’s president, Patrick Ewing. Hunter and Ewing were joined 
on the union’s negotiating team by Alonzo Mourning, among others. Both Ewing 
and Mourning are NBA players who are represented by agent David Falk, who also 
represented other superstar players such as Michael Jordan. Many observers of the 
negotiations felt that Falk and/or the interests of a few superstars were dominating 
the union’s position (Starr & Samuels, 1999, p. 49). Hunter summoned players to 
New York on January 5 to show support for the union bargaining team’s hard-line 
stance against a hard cap. Instead, the majority of players seemed to feel the same as 
one veteran all star, who was quoted as saying, “We told [Hunter]. ‘Go in and get a 
deal and leave the two angry brothers [Ewing and Mourning] at home’ ” (Starr & 
Samuels, 1999, p. 49). On January 6, 1999, a new, 6-year agreement was finally 
reached, just a day before the so-called drop-dead date proposed by the NBA’s 
commissioner, David Stern, when the rest of the season would be canceled 
(Pedulla, 1999). 
 
This compromise agreement represents an interesting case study in the politics 
of collective action. The players were represented at the negotiating table primarily 
by highly paid individuals who stood to lose a great deal in future compensation if 
the Bird Exception were deleted from the agreement. The concerns of the average 
wage earner in the NBA initially did not seem to be of prime concern to the union’s 
leadership. The owners also had some divergent agendas at the bargaining table. 
Although all the owners wanted some means to control their costs, owners of 
small-market franchises might have wanted hard salary caps on overall team payrolls 
so they could reach profitability, and owners of large-market teams that were 
profitable might have wanted merely to contain the upward salary spiral while not 
losing their superstar players because of hard caps. 
 
Somehow, the process of intraorganizational bargaining within the owners’ and 
players’ groups and interorganizational bargaining between these groups led to the 
median wage earner in the NBA becoming a focal point in the NBA negotiations.3 
The following quotation is from a published letter dated December 17, 1998, written 
by G.William Hunter to all NBA players in response to a memo by David Stern. 
The quotation makes it clear that the union’s chief negotiator expected proposals 
for the new CBA to address the growing skewness in player earnings: 
 
The owners’ proposals have done next to nothing to try to restore the middle class, our 
primary goal in this round of bargaining. Stern heralds the purported increases in the 
average salary which are significantly lower than the percentage increases we enjoyed 
in recent years, especially once the players’ BRI is cut to 52% in three years—but 
doesn’t dare make any projections about the growth of the median salary. . . . As we 
have said all along, we already have agreed to make enormous compromises for 
high-end players and remain willing to negotiate even further but only if this sacrifice 
will result in improved salaries for the lower and middle earning players. (Hunter, 
1998) 
This development in the NBA negotiations came as little surprise to some 
observers of sports unions. Fort and Quirk (1995) noted in an article in the Journal 
of Economic Literature on professional sports leagues that “the fact that free agency 
has led to a more skewed distribution of player salaries in baseball raises some 
interesting questions as to negotiating positions unions might take in the future” (p. 
1297). Although Fort and Quirk (1995) were discussing a different sport, the same 
conclusion could obviously apply to basketball. The question that remains to be 
answered is whether or not the new provisions incorporated into the new NBA CBA 
will go far enough to correct this salary skewness. Gramlich (1994)would probably 
describe the new agreement as an even greater example of communitarian capitalism 
representing even greater cooperation between labor and management. Others 
might suggest that the voice of the median voter in the union has finally surfaced.4 
 
 
 
THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL AND THE NEW NBA CBA 
 
The median voter model has become the dominant model with which to analyze 
collective bargaining. Parson (1992) stated that “decision making in U.S. is collective 
and democratic suggesting that voting models are the appropriate tools of analysis 
for union behavior” (p. 439). Parson further suggested that “this insight is hindered 
by the fact that majority rule voting among self-interested voters over 
multidimensional issues such as those faced by a union electorate—wages, 
employment, and other working conditions—does not generally yield a voting 
equilibrium” (p. 439). Many variations of the median voter model have been developed 
to provide insights into which voting equilibrium will arise. We suggest that 
the new NBA CBA provides a case study with which to test the implications of various 
manifestations of the median voter model that have been developed to better 
understand union decisions. 
 
Many authors have used the median voter model to analyze union behavior. 
White (1982), using a rational, self-interested median voter model, suggested that 
the within-union wage structure would be changed to increase the shares of the total 
wage bill received by median members of the bargaining unit. Black and Parker 
(1985) suggested that older workers reap more of the rents of unionization than 
younger workers because median voters approve seniority-based layoff rules. Parson 
(1992) suggested that union members tend to be egalitarian in nature and not 
strictly self-interested. He suggested that median voter models must incorporate 
aspects of egalitarian nature when voters will approve of contracts that do not necessarily 
benefit themselves but instead benefit individuals lower in the wage distri- 
bution. Bishop, Formby, and Smith (1991) suggested that a risk-averse median 
voter decision would rely not only on the expected rents received but on the distribution 
of rents. They suggested that a median voter would trade reduced risk (wage 
dispersion) for return. In a related article, Bishop et al. (1990) suggested that NFL 
players are risk averse in their preference for free agency. 
 
To focus our analysis of the new NBA CBA, we developed the following questions 
from predictions of the various median voter models. First, are NBA players 
rationally self-interested, as suggested by White (1982), or are they egalitarian, as 
suggested by Parson (1992)? Second, do more tenured players gain at the expense 
of less tenured players, as suggested by Black and Parker (1985)? Third, are NBA 
players more risk averse in their decision making, as suggested by Bishop, Formby, 
et al. (1991)? To analyze these questions, we developed a model of union decision 
making that incorporates both the market forces of free agency and the median 
voter forces of rent sharing. 
 
In sports unions, pay is determined more by performance and to a fairly lesser 
extent by seniority.5 Players are cut or released from teams based on ability and performance, 
not seniority. In Equation 1, we formally model a player’s wage. 
 
W = MRP + r,     (1) 
 
where a player’s wage (W) is determined by two components: the player’s marginal 
revenue product (MRP) and the player’s share of the rent (r).We assume that r can 
be both positive and negative. An example of a negative rent paid to a player is the 
amount of labor exploitation in a traditional monopsony model. We also suggest 
that the new CBA imposes a negative rent share on superstar salaries. 
We specify the monopoly face and collective voice face of unions with two differing 
objective functions derived from a wage equation. From this wage equation, 
we can develop two union objective functions: the traditional monopoly objective 
function and the median voter objective function. The traditional monopoly objective 
function is 
 
Max ∑ r,    (2) 
 
in which the union’s objective function is to maximize the sum of the rents that 
accrue to its members. We argue that this has been the primary objective function of 
sports unions in the past. 
 
The second objective function that arises within unions is the median voter 
objective function: 
 
Max MRPk + rk,   (3) 
 
where k is the kth player in the wage distribution. In this objective function, the 
MRP is determined by the market, and r is determined by the CBA. 
 
Considering the various median voter models, we suggest that if a voter is rationally 
self-interested, r will increase as the kth member nears the median income 
position. This predicts that the greatest gains will be found in the 50th percentile of 
a Lorenz curve. Furthermore, if voters are rationally self-interested, r should be 
greater for existing members and lowest for members who just joined the union. If 
voters are egalitarian, r should be at least as great for the players at the bottom of the 
wage distribution as for those at the median position. If voters are risk averse, the 
variation of the overall wage distribution (MRP + r) should fall. The risk-averse 
median voter model also suggests that there are times when the median wage will 
fall as long as the variation in income is more than offset by the lowering of the 
median wage. 
 
To test the implications of the various median voter models, we compared 
aspects of traditional unions to certain elements of the new NBA CBA that illustrate 
attempts to appease median voters. In many traditional unions today, new hires find 
that they are paid according to a lower scale than more veteran workers. The difference 
in such pay is not merely the result of seniority pay increments; it stems from 
the use of two-tiered pay systems. Many unions accept lower pay scales and/or benefits 
for new hires during negotiations to preserve better terms for existing members. 
This behavior obviously bolsters the case of the median voter model in unions. 
A similar element exists in the new NBA agreement. Both the old and new CBAs 
call for 3-year rookie contracts determined by a scale. The scale is used to set the 
salary in each of the first 3 years of a player’s tenure in the NBA based on when he 
was chosen in the first round of the draft. The salary scale over the 3-year period is 
lower under the new CBA.6 Also, under the new CBA, teams hold an option for a 
4th year after the 3-year rookie scale contract expires and the right of first refusal for 
the 5th year; previously, first-round draft picks could opt for unrestricted free 
agency after the expirations of their rookie scale contracts. For second-round draft 
picks, teams will have rights of first refusal until the players accrue 3 years of experience; 
under the old agreement, such players were unrestricted free agents following 
the expirations of their first NBA contracts. Also, first-round draft picks such as 
Kevin Garnett will no longer be able to negotiate extensions to their rookie scale 
contracts after only their second season in the NBA. Now, such players cannot 
negotiate extensions to their rookie scale contracts until their option year. Thus, 
provisions of the new CBA support Black and Parker’s (1985) model: The union 
voters distribute the rents from the players with less seniority to the players with 
more years in the league. 
 
No maximum limits existed under the old agreement for individual player salaries. 
Under the new CBA, the maximum annual salary is $9 million, or 25% of the 
salary cap, for players with 0 to 6 years of experience; $11 million, or 30% of 
the cap, for players with 7 to 9 years of experience; and $14 million, or 35.5% of the 
cap, for players with 10 or more years of experience. A player in the 1st year of a 
new contract can earn either 105% of his previous season salary or the applicable 
maximum described above, whichever is greater. Annual pay raises are restricted to 
10% for most players and 12% for “Bird free agents” under the new CBA. Under 
the previous agreement, salary increases were limited to 20% each year with some 
exceptions. 
 
 
These maximum limits will undoubtedly be constraining on the salaries and 
mobility of superstar free agents.7 Table 1 lists the players who were earning above 
these limits when the new agreement was reached. Table 2 lists the players who 
negotiated salaries at the maximum allowable levels after the new CBA went into 
effect. The salary savings generated in the future from these individual pay constraints 
will be sizable. The union made it clear during negotiations that the quid pro 
quo for these limits are provisions to improve the salaries of median-income wage 
earners, supporting White’s (1986) self-interest median voter model of unions. 
 
Under the terms of the 1995 agreement, minimum salaries of $242,000 for 
rookie players and $272,500 for veteran players were established for the 1997-1998 
season. The new CBA calls for a sliding scale minimum wage based on years of service. 
The minimum wage for rookies is set at $275,000 and increases for each additional 
year of service in the league up to a maximum of $1 million for players with 
10 years of experience.8 A veteran player with 10 or more years of experience such 
as Joe Klein, who played sparingly for the Chicago Bulls in the 1997-1998 season 
for $272,500, would earn over $700,000 more under the new agreement. 
 
This provision obviously appeals to veteran, journeyman players. To prevent 
teams from choosing lower priced rookie players over higher priced veterans, the 
compensation for players with 5 or more years of experience above the pay for a 
player with 4 years of experience is paid out of a league wide fund created and maintained 
by the NBA (see National Basketball Association, 1995, Article IV, Section 
1[l][1], pp. 39-40). This portion of the new agreement not only enhances the pay of 
a portion of the lowest earners in the NBA but also injects a dose of seniority pay 
into the pay structure, further supporting Black and Parker’s (1985) model. 
 
Salary cap exceptions in the new CBA also demonstrate direct appeal to median 
voters. The previous CBA contained several exceptions to the salary cap. The most 
controversial exception to the soft cap from the owners’ perspective was the previously 
mentioned Bird Exception. In addition to the Bird Exception, exceptions for 
disabled players’ replacements, assigned players acquired through trades, rookie 
scale contracts, contracts at the league’s minimum salary, and a $1 million exception 
were also included in the CBA. This last exception could not be used in consecutive 
seasons. 
 
Under the new agreement, all of the previous exceptions to the team salary cap 
remain; the only qualification to the exceptions is that individual salaries cannot 
exceed the maximum individual caps previously mentioned. In addition, a 
“midlevel” exception has been added. The midlevel exception is $1.75 million in 
the 1st year of the CBA and increases to 108% of the average salary for the prior 
season by the end of the CBA. It can be used in each season. This exception is 
designed to increase the salaries of middle-class players in terms of the salary distribution, 
further supporting White’s (1986) self-interest median voter model. 
 
The biggest potential sacrifice by the players in the new CBA is the salary recovery 
provision, which becomes operative if collective salaries exceed a specified 
percentage of BRI. The determination of what constitutes BRI is a negotiation 
nightmare. In the past, teams underreported revenues for this calculation through 
the accounting complexities of joint ownership of a team and a broadcast station. 
The Bird Exception made this practice somewhat a nonissue because the cap was 
soft, not hard. The new agreement does not have a set percentage for the first 3 years 
but calls for salaries to be no more than 55% of revenues in the 4th, 5th, and 6th 
years and no more than 57% of revenues in the 7th year, if owners exercise their 
option to extend the agreement. If salaries exceed the cap limit, the CBA calls for 
the NBA to recover the excess pay by levying an escrow tax of equal percentage 
amounts on the compensation of all “adjustment players.” The addition to the CBA 
of excess salary recovery by the owners makes the calculation and inclusion of all 
relevant revenue for BRI extremely important. All players, except those who sign 
one or two 10-day contracts, are considered adjustment players unless the union 
decides on an alternative method for recovery of the overspending. Theoretically, 
the agreement would allow for the union to use this mechanism to further address 
the issue of salary inequity. Current projections of player salaries and BRI for the 
2001-2002 season suggest that the excess salary recovery plan will be necessary.9 
This part of the agreement suggests that the median voters and team owners formed 
a coalition to shift rents received by superstar players and allocate them between 
team owners and median voters. 
 
It is clear that the new NBA agreement has added provisions designed to 
improve the skewed distribution of salaries. We now examine evidence from the 
1998-1999 and 1999-2000 seasons to determine the effects of these measures. 
 
 
NBA SALARY DISTRIBUTION DATA 
 
In Tables 3 and 4, we analyze how the new CBA changed the distribution of 
wages in the NBA. In Table 3, we provide details on the distribution ofwages in the 
NBA using basic descriptive statistics, and in Table 4, we provide Lorenz curves 
and Gini coefficients, the traditional tools used to analyze income inequality. The 
data in Table 3 clearly show the unequal distribution of salaries in the NBA. The 
growth of the mean salary in theNBAfrom the 1993-1994 season to the 1997-1998 
season was approximately 78.5%, whereas the median salary rose by only 31.3%. 
The value of the standard error has shown enormous growth. The positive measure 
of skewness indicates that the salaries above the average are more dispersed than 
those belowthe average.10 Note the huge rise in this measure during this period. The 
positive values for kurtosis indicate that the salary distribution is more peaked 
around its center than a normal curve; some salaries in the league are far from the 
mean relative to other salaries.11 
 
Data from the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 seasons indicate some improvement in 
the area of income inequality and skewness in the NBA. The value of the measures 
for skewness and kurtosis dropped substantially in the 1998-1999 season and fell 
even further in the 1999-2000 season.12 The gap between the mean and median salaries 
worsened slightly in the 1998-1999 season, but the gap stayed the same in the 
1999-2000 season. The reason for the slight change might be that only 184 of the 
422 players in the salary distribution signed new agreements in 1999. The majority 
of players had already signed multiyear contracts before the negotiation of the new 
CBA. In fact, the mean salary for those who signed contracts in 1999 was only 
$1,529,768, compared with an average of $3,166,623 for contracts signed before 
1999. Obviously, the new signings are much more heavily tilted toward the lower 
pay scale, with 34 rookies signing contracts at the league minimum of $287,500 and 
15 signing contracts at the minimum of $350,000 for players with 1 year of experience. 
Restricting the sample to players with more than 2 years of experience, however, 
reveals an even greater gap in means; players signing new agreements have an 
average salary of $1,935,633, whereas players who had signed an agreement prior 
to the 1999 negotiations have an average salary of $4,284,542. 
 
 
 
 
To further analyze how the new CBA influenced the distribution of wages in the 
NBA, we calculated the Lorenz curves and the Gini coefficients for the 5 years prior 
to the new contract and the 2 years after the contract. In the 5 years prior to the new 
contract, wage dispersion grew substantially, with the Gini coefficient growing 
from .41 in the 1993-1994 season to .52 in the 1997-1998 season, just prior to the 
new CBA. Using the Lorenz curves and the stochastic dominance test, we found 
that the 1993-1994 season dominates the 1997-1998 season for all ordinates.13 The 
Lorenz curve analysis suggests that salary dispersion was worsening just prior to 
the agreement: Whereas 60% of the players earned 30.1% of the income in the 
1993-1994 season, they earned only 22.6% of the income in the 1997-1998 season. 
For the 1999-2000 season, 2 years after the CBA, the Lorenz curve analysis suggests 
that wage dispersion fell, with the 1999-2000 season stochastically dominating 
the 1997-1998 season for all ordinates except the fourth ordinate. Thus, for the 
first three ordinates, the players in the lower 60% of the wage distribution gain in 
percentage of income earned, whereas those in the top 40% of the wage distribution 
lose in percentage of income earned. The Lorenz curve analysis supports both 
White’s (1986) model of rational self-interest and Parson’s (1992) egalitarian 
median voter model. That is, median voters and players in the lower end of the wage 
distribution gain rents, whereas those in the top end of the wage distribution lose 
rents. Overall, the data suggest that the new CBA has narrowed the wage distribution 
in the NBA, with the greatest gains going to the median voters. 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
During negotiations for the latest CBA, the NBPA leadership focused the latter 
rounds of discussion on the skewness of the NBA’s salary distribution. The proposals 
by the union suggest that the union leaders are finally responding to the voice of 
the median voters. The median voters, motivated by rational self-interest and egalitarianism, 
shift rents from the superstars to everybody else. In addition, we suggest 
that many of the provisions of the new CBA attempt to raise the salaries of lower 
paid players in the league, whereas others place a hard cap on the salaries of superstars. 
The evidence from the first two seasons under the new agreement suggests 
some mild improvement in the salary distribution. With the number and length of 
long-term contracts, even mild improvements suggest that the CBA has been successful 
in correcting the skewness of the NBA’s salary distribution. The union’s 
decisions on the taxation of adjustment players’ salaries to correct for overpay in 
future seasons, should such measures become necessary, will give an indication of 
the sincerity of its leadership in addressing this issue. 
 
The upcoming negotiations in other professional sports will undoubtedly be 
affected by the latest NBA agreement. It will be interesting to see if the members of 
other sports unions push for more egalitarian salary distributions at the start of 
negotiations or whether management ties this issue to salary caps. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. For details on how free agency was achieved in professional baseball, football, basketball, 
and hockey, see Staudohar (1996). 
2. Salary data (Bender, n.d.) indicate that for the 1993-1994 season, only 1 team was under the 
cap; for the 1994-1995 season, no teams were under the cap; for the 1995-1996 season, 12 
teams were under the cap; for the 1996-1997 season, 4 teams were under the cap; for the 
1997-1998 season, 8 teams were under the cap; and for the 1998-1999 season, 2 teams were 
under the cap. 
 
3. In this article, we focus on the new agreement from the perspective of the players. It is clear 
from the negotiations that the owners manipulated the situation to pit the median voters against 
the superstars to gain more economic rent. 
 
4. It is difficult to precisely characterize the median voter in the NBA. The players who occupy 
the 50th percentile of the salary distribution are a mixed lot. Some of these players are in the 
midst of a rookie scale contract and may be rising stars who will skyrocket to the upper income 
levels on reaching free agency. These players were not members of the union when they signed 
their initial contracts. The players to whom the union tried to appeal with the provisions of the 
latest CBA are the veterans who are not stars. Such players probably have approximately 5 or 
more years of experience and are role players. They may or may not be starters on their teams. 
If they start, they are probably defensive stoppers, rebounders, or playmakers, not major 
scorers. 
 
5. Hill and Spellman (1984) found that the introduction of free agency into major league baseball 
caused a decrease in the level of pay based on years of service and an increase in pay based 
on level of performance. 
 
6. For instance, the sum of the rookie scale salaries (1999-2000 + 2000-2001 + 2001-2002) for 
the first pick in the draft in 1999 is $881,700 less under the new agreement compared with the 
exact same figures under the old agreement. See Exhibit B in National Basketball Association 
(1995, 1999). 
 
7. Boeck (1999) reported that Shaquille O’Neal, of the Los Angeles Lakers, would sacrifice 
millions of dollars if he chose to exercise the opt-out clause in his multiyear deal, because of the 
new CBA. If he exercised his option and left the Lakers after the 1998-1999 season, the most 
he could earn with a new club in the 1999-2000 season would be 105% of his 1998-1999 salary, 
or $15.75 million, compared with the $17.1 million that the Lakers will pay him if he stays. 
 
8. For the full minimum annual salary scale, see Exhibit C in National Basketball Association 
(1999). 
 
9. At its annual meeting in July 2000, the NBPA told players that current projections for the 
2001-2002 season placed salaries at 64% of BRI, well above the 55% trigger level for excess 
pay recovery. Players were told to prepare for a 10% escrow tax on their salaries for that 
season. Apparently, no alternative plans were discussed for the excess pay recovery (see 
Wyche, 2000). 
 
10. The measure of skewness used equals [n / (n – 1)(n – 2)] × Σ[(xj – x) / s]3, where s is the 
standard deviation, x is the mean, and n is the sample size. 
 
11. The measure of kurtosis used equals {[n(n+1) / (n – 1)(n – 2)(n – 3)]×Σ[(xj – x) / s]4} – [3(n–
1)2 / (n – 2)(n – 3)], where s is the standard deviation, x is the mean, and n is the sample size. 
 
12. Most of the reduction of the measure of skewness and kurtosis in the 1998-1999 season 
was due to the retirement of Michael Jordan and the removal of his $33 million salary. 
 
13.We used the distribution-free statistical inference t test developed by Beach and Davidson 
(1983) for Lorenz curves, which was first applied to sports by Porter and Scully (1996). First, we 
calculated the relevant standard error for each ordinate. Then, we calculated a comparison of 
ordinates over time.We found that with the exception of two crossings, early Lorenz curves (for 
the 1993-1994 season) stochastically dominate those just prior to the new CBA. We then found 
that the Lorenz curve for the 2 years after the new CBA stochastically dominates for the first 
three ordinates (through the 60th percentile). 
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